Wireless sensor networks are often more vulnerable than wired ones. Especially, an adversary can attack the networks by utilizing false route information. A countermeasure against the attack is a secure routing protocol with digital signatures to guarantee the validity of route information. However, existing secure routing protocols are inefficient because the memory size and the computational overhead are heavy. To overcome these problems, we focus on ID-based sequential aggregate signatures (IBSAS) (Boldyreva et al., 2007) . IBSAS allow users to aggregate individual signatures into a single signature. Moreover, certificates of public keys are unnecessary for IBSAS. Therefore, IBSAS can drastically decrease the memory size and the computational overhead. Besides, one of the main concerns for practical use is to construct a protocol specification with IBSAS. Moreover, since IBSAS are sometimes weak against compromising secret keys, another concern is to construct its countermeasure. For these purposes, we propose a secure dynamic source routing with ID-based sequential aggregate signatures, called ISDSR for short and discuss the key management to revoke/update compromised keys. We also show that the performance of ISDSR is the best in comparison with the existing protocols.
INTRODUCTION

Background
When devices send data in wireless sensor networks, intermediate devices relay the received data to its destination as routers. This mechanism is known as a multi-hop routing protocol. There are also two types of mechanisms; namely dynamic source routing (DSR) protocol (Johnson and Maltz, 1996) and an ad hoc on-demand distance vector (AODV) protocol (Perkins and Royer, 1999) . Both protocols are well-known instantiations. From the standpoint of an adversary, wireless sensor networks are more vulnerable than wired ones since the adversary can attack by a setup of its own devices within the networks. For example, malicious devices can inject false route information (Karlof and Wagner, 2003) , and then packets are looped or transferred unnecessarily to far nodes. A sinkhole attack (Karlof and Wagner, 2003) also exists, where data is collected to malicious nodes managed by an adversary.
One of the potential approaches to preventing these attacks is to guarantee the validity of the route information to secure routing protocols with authentication tools such as digital signatures. This has been proposed (Hu et al., 2002a; Zapata and Asokan, 2002) . Several standardized organizations such as the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) have suggested the use of digital signatures to prevent forgery of information or unauthorized accesses (Guillemin, 2007) . We thus focus on digital signatures. Nevertheless, utilizing digital signatures brings problems for the memory size and the computational overhead. From another standpoint of sensor networks, the batteries of sensor devices are small and low-capacity. Hence, the memory size and the computational overhead should be small. Based on these mechanisms and approaches, our goal is to construct a secure routing protocol with both minimum memory size and lower computational overhead.
Problems for Secure Routing Protocols
antee the validity of the route information. In particular, each node generates signatures on route information when the node sends a packet including the route information. Any node that received the packets and the signatures verify its validity. However, a trivial use of digital signatures increases the data size of the packets linearly in proportion to the number of nodes. This then requires each node to contain a large size of memory storage and it also requires a large amount of computational time to verify all of the signatures. Moreover, since certificates for public keys are necessary, obtaining and verifying the certificates often require large cost. Although Kim and Tsudik (Kim and Tsudik, 2009 ), Ghosh and Datta (Ghosh and Datta, 2011) and Muranaka et al. (Muranaka et al., 2015) have proposed secure routing protocols to decrease the overhead of signatures by the use of multisignatures, they are still insufficient due to the verification of public keys via certificates. Verification including certificates for public key often require heavy cost, and thus the existing protocols are unpractical due to the large overhead.
Contributions
In this work, we propose a new secure routing protocol to guarantee the validity of the route information, which is the most efficient for the memory size and the computational overhead in existing secure routing protocols. In particular, in addition to combining individual signatures into a single short signature,verification of public keys via certificates are unnecessary for our protocol. Our main approach is to utilize ID-based sequential aggregate signatures (IB-SAS) (Boldyreva et al., 2007) . We name the proposed protocol a secure DSR with ID-based sequential aggregate signatures (ISDSR). The IBSAS use digital signatures to obtain both multisignatures (Itakura and Nakamura, 1983) where signatures are compressed into a single short signature and ID-based signatures (Shamir, 1984) so that any identity can be used as a public key for each user. Although there are several secure routing protocols (Kim and Tsudik, 2009; Muranaka et al., 2015) with multisignatures that decrease the size of signatures, they are still unpractical due to verifications of public keys via certificates. In comparison, our proposed protocol removes such verifications of public keys by virtue of ID-based signatures. Our primary contribution is to propose a protocol specification of ISDSR for practical use. A new protocol specification is required for DSR with IBSAS because IBSAS are different from the conventional digital signatures in terms of multisignatures and IDbased signatures. Constructing an efficient and feasible specification is still a challenge problem. Furthermore, since identities are used as public keys and they are unique information, it is also difficult for IDbased signatures to revoke/update keys if the keys are compromised. Therefore, we clarify the specification and discuss the management of public keys. We show that the performance of ISDSR is the best relatively to the existing protocols. In this work, we focus on DSR as a routing protocol in ad hoc networks. We consider that the main construction of ISDSR can be extended to other routing protocols such as AODV.
RELATED WORKS
Zhou and Haas (Zhou and Haas, 1999) proposed the first secure routing protocol for key management on ad hoc networks. Hu et al. (Hu et al., 2002a; Hu et al., 2005) have proposed Ariadne in DSR (Johnson and Maltz, 1996) with message authentication codes (MAC) and protocols with digital signatures. Next, Papadimitratos and Haas (Papadimitratos and Haas, 2002) (Hu et al., 2002b) in destination-sequenced distance vector protocol (DSDV) (Broch et al., 1998) . SEAD has utilized MAC. In AODV (Perkins and Royer, 1999) , Zapata and Asokan firstly proposed secure AODV (SAODV) (Zapata and Asokan, 2002) . SAODV is based on both types of cryptography. Following these authors, Sangiri et al. (Sanzgiri et al., 2005) showed the vulnerabilities of SAODV and the proposed ARAN to improve the vulnerabilities by utilizing public key cryptography.
In recent years, there are three protocols with signature schemes for multiple signers. The first protocol is the secure route discovery protocol (SRDP) by Kim and Tsudik (Kim and Tsudik, 2009) , and they have utilized sequential aggregate signatures (Lysyanskaya et al., 2004) and accountable-subgroup multisignatures (Boldyreva, 2003; Micali et al., 2001 ). Ghosh and Datta (Ghosh and Datta, 2011) have proposed identity based secure AODV (IDSAODV) with the sequential aggregate signatures. IDSAODV is the second protocol. However, we mention that their meaning "identity-based" is different from the use of ID-based signatures. That is, IDSAODV does not utilize ID-based signatures, but the sequential aggregate signature schemes. Moreover, public keys of all nodes for IDSAODV are registered in each node in advance. Thus, IDSAODV is impractical. The third protocol is the secure routing protocols by Muranaka et al. (Muranaka et al., 2015) , and these protocols are based on ordered multisignatures (Boldyreva et al., 2007; Yanai et al., 2013) and general aggregate signatures (Boneh et al., 2003) . However, they are still insufficient as described in the previous section.
In the ID-based setting, Ghosh and Datta (Ghosh and Datta, 2013 ) also have proposed the secure dynamic routing protocol (SDRP) utilizing an ID-based key exchange protocol. However, the cost of their work seems to be inefficient compared to the works of (Kim and Tsudik, 2009; Muranaka et al., 2015) since SDRP requires each node to keep the linear size of shared keys with respect to the number of signers. Namely, each node has to keep both ID information for other nodes and its shared keys to communicate each other to verify the validity of route information. We emphasize that it is quite different from our work in the sense of the use of ID-based signature schemes for multiple signers. More precisely, each node for our protocol can keep only ID information to verify validity.
DYNAMIC SOURCE ROUTING
DSR (Johnson and Maltz, 1996 ) is a routing protocol designed for an ad hoc network. It can construct autonomous sensor networks. DSR has two functions, i.e., route discovery and route maintenance. The route discovery searches for a route and constructs a route when a transfer is required. The route maintenance restores a route which has broken.
Route Discovery
The route discovery finds a route when a node has a packet to send to a destination. The route discovery consists of a search phase with route request packets (RREQs) and a reply phase with route reply packets (RREPs) .
In the search phase, a source node broadcasts RREQs around the node. Intermediate nodes write route information to the RREQ by adding their own IDs to the RREQ and broadcasting this information to neighbor nodes. This process is iterated until a destination node receives the RREQ. Then the destination node knows the route information through the RREQ. Since RREQ is transmitted as a local broadcast, a node often receives the RREQ transmitted by the node-self in advance. In such a case, the node checks whether its own ID is written in RREQ. If so, the node detects a loop and discards the RREQ.
The RREQ consists of header and route information as in Figure 1 . According to RFC4728 (Johnson et al., 2007) , a source node ID and a destination node ID are included in the IP field. However, we do not assume the other layers, and consider that these IDs are included in the route information. In the reply phase, the destination node sends the RREP to the source node when it receives the RREQ. The RREP is given the route which has been found by the RREQ. The destination node informs the source node of the route by sending the RREP via the reverse order of the route. When the source node receives the RREP, the route between the source node and the destination node is constructed. Then the source node sends data to the destination node via the route. The source node stores the route information in the cache and reuses it when it sends data to the same destination node.
Route Maintenance
In Route Maintenance, when a node detects a broken route, it sends other nodes route error packets (RERRs) and informs them of the destruction of the route. The node which has detected the broken route, for a short detect node, checks its own cache to see whether there are substitute routes. If so, the detect node changes the route to the substitute route and continues to send data via the substitute route. Otherwise, the detect node sends a RERR to the source node which has sent data via the broken route. If the nodes which received the RERR have the broken route in their cache, they delete the route in their cache. RERR consists of a header and error information as described in Figure 2 . In the route maintenance, 3 is set in error type and the broken node is described in type specific information. Therefore, RERR is constructed as in Figure 3 in the route main- tenance. That is, the detect node ID is described in the Error Source Node ID and the source node ID which has sent data via the broken route is described in the Error Destination ID. The broken node ID is then described in the Unreachable Node ID.
ISDSR Model
Security Requirements
Sanzgiri et al. (Sanzgiri et al., 2005) argued that secure routing protocols should satisfy five security requirements when a route is constructed. However, these requirements can be integrated into two requirements. Therefore, we designed ISDSR to satisfy the following two requirements:.
1. Attackers cannot spoof other nodes.
Attackers cannot forge route information.
We define "guaranteeing the validity of the route information" as satisfying the above two requirements. ISDSR guarantees the validity of route information.
Assumptions
Node Assumptions. The network consists of two kinds of nodes, i.e., sensor nodes and a management server. We hereafter refer to sensor nodes as nodes. The management server manages other nodes. In other words, the management server issues an identity for each node, and generates a secret key for each node. We explain this in more detail in Section 6.1.
Network Assumptions. In the network, data is transmitted in both directions.
Attack Model
We define honest nodes as nodes which are managed by the management server, and attacker nodes as nodes which are non-managed. Honest nodes work as a specification of the protocol. The purpose of attackers is to attack networks which consist of only honest nodes to set their own nodes. This network is opened and the attacker can eavesdrop and manipulate data. Although sensor networks are vulnerable to DoS attacks such as jamming on the physical layer, we do not consider these attacks in this paper. We also do not consider the attacks on a media access control protocol. The attackers cannot hijack, rob, or destroy honest nodes. Attackers forge and manipulate the route information so that packets go through attack nodes. This attack model is equivalent to the definition of that a " managed-open attack" according to Sanzgiri et al. (Sanzgiri et al., 2005) .
DESIGN PRINCIPLE
Foundation of ID-based Signature Schemes for Multiple Signers
As ID-based signature schemes for multiple signers can aggregate signatures into a single signature, the size of the signatures is constant with respect to the number of signers. Because they are ID-based signatures, certificates of public keys are unnecessary. Currently, there are ID-based aggregate signatures (IBAS) (Gentry and Ramzan, 2006) and ID-based sequential aggregate signatures (IBSAS) (Boldyreva et al., 2007) as ID-based signature schemes for multiple signers. The difference between these two schemes is the timing of the aggregation of the signatures. In IBAS, any signer can aggregate individually generated signatures. On the other hand, each signer for IBSAS generates signatures and their aggregation on the same algorithm. The restriction of the timing of aggregation in IBSAS is stronger than that in IBAS. However, each signer can only send a single signature in IBSAS. The functionality of IBSAS is sufficient for exchanging one signature between nodes in a secure routing protocol. The other difference is the necessity of a time stamp. It is necessary for IBAS and it is unnecessary in IBSAS. Since DSR does not require the time stamp, the use of IBSAS is more suitable than IBAS. Based on these observations, we utilize IBSAS in DSR.
Identity-based Sequential Aggregate Signatures
Algebraic Setting
Let G, G T be groups of the same prime order p. A paring is an efficiently computable map e: G × G → G T such that the following two conditions hold;
• Bilinearity: For all u, v ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z, we have e(au, bv) =e(u, v) ab .
• Non-degeneracy: For any generator g ∈ G * , we have e(g, g) = 1 G T where 1 G T is an identity element over G T . That is e(g, g) generates G T We call (p, G, G T , e) a bilinear-map parameter.
Algorithm
IBSAS have four algorithms, i.e., Setup, KeyDerivation, Signing and Verification. These algorithms are described in Algorithm 1-4. Ensure: Master public key mpk and master secret key msk 1: generate the bilinear-map parameter (p, G, G T , e) Require: if e(σ 1 , g) Table 1 . In this work, we assume that headers are updated in a similar manner to that of the conventional DSR. In other words, we leave this as an open problem where we discuss the detail of the headers. (k, m) ciphertext for a message m by a shared key k Dec (k, c) message decoded for a ciphertext c by a shared key k
Setup
A management server generates a master public key and a master secret key through the Setup of IBSAS.
The management server issues an identity for each of the nodes, and generates an ID's secret key corresponding to the ID for each of the nodes through the KeyDerivation of IBSAS. The management server also generates a shared key for each of the nodes to communicate encrypted messages between the management server and each of the nodes. Each of nodes pre-installs the master public key, the secret key for the node's IDs and the shared key.
Secure Route Discovery
Basic Concept
ISDSR constructs a route via the secure route discovery instead of the route discovery in DSR, and guarantees that there are no attacker nodes in the route. IS-DSR searches a route with secure route request packets (SRREQs), and construct the route with secure route reply packets (SRREPs).
Search Phase
The search phase for the secure route discovery is the same as that in DSR except for adding each node's signature to a packet. Namely, SRREQ consists of a header, route information and a signature as described in Figure 4 . A source node writes its own ID in route information. The source node then generates a signature for route information through the Signing of IBSAS and adds the signature to the SRREQ. The source node broadcasts the SRREQ to neighbor nodes. A node that receives the SRREQ adds its own ID to the route information. The node generates a new signature for the route information as a message and the signature in SRREQ by Signing. The node replaces the old signature with the new signature in the SRREQ, and broadcasts it around the node. When the destination node receives the SRREQ, it verifies the signature in the SRREQ using received intermediate nodes IDs by Verification of the IBSAS. If the signature is valid, the destination node starts the reply phase. Otherwise, the node waits until the node receives the SRREQ whose signature is valid.
Reply Phase
In the reply phase, the destination node generates a signature for route information by Signing. It adds the signature to SRREP and sends the SRREP to its source node. When the source node receives the SR-REP, the source node verifies the signature in the SR-REP Verification with the destination node ID. If the signature is valid, the route is constructed. Otherwise, the source node discards the SRREP. 
Algorithms
Notations are as described in Table 1 . SRREQ consists of three elements as described in Figure 4 ; i.e., a header hd, route information RI and a signature σ. SRREP consists of three elements as described in Figure 5; i.e., a header hd, route information RI and a signature σ. A header in ISDSR is the same as that in DSR. RI consists of three kinds of identity; i.e., a source node ID, a destination node ID and the intermediate nodes ID. A destination node in SRREP is the same as a source node in SRREQ. RI in SRREP is given as the reverse order of RI in SRREQ. Functions SRREQConstructCSRREPConstruct, LoopCheck and SRREPHeaderUpdate are described in Function 1 -4DSRREQConstruct which takes as input a header, route information and a signature, is a function which updates the header in a similar manner as DSR, and constructs a SRREQ with these three kinds of elements, i.e., the header, the route information and the signature. LoopCheck which takes as input a node ID and route information, is a function which checks whether the node ID is included in the route information. If so, it returns 1. Otherwise, it returns 0. SRREPConstruct which takes as input route information and a signature, is a function which constructs the header in a similar manner as that of the conventional DSR, and a SRREP with the header and the route information. The route information in SRREP is the reverse order of route information described in the input in a similar manner as that of the conventional DSR. SRREPHeaderUpdate which takes as input SRREP, is a function which constructs the SR-REP, in which the header is updated. Algorithm 5 -10 are algorithms in the secure route discovery. 
.1 Basic Concept
A node detects a link break to the next hop in data transfer. The detect node sends a secure route error packets (SRERRs) to a source node. The SRERR is as described in Figure 6 , and includes a signature generated by the detect node via Signing. Intermediate nodes between the detect node and its source node just transfer the SRERR. The source node verifies the signature by Verification with the detect node ID and transfers the data again by a route which does not include the broken link.
Algorithm 6: The search phase on an i-th node.
Require:
discard SRREQ ID i−1 3:
return 0 4: else 5:
return SSREQ ID i 9: end if Algorithm 7: The search phase on a destination node.
Require: SRREQ ID
wait other SRREQs 3: end while 4: return 1 Algorithm 8: The reply phase on a destination node.
Algorithm 9: The reply phase on a i-th node.
Algorithms
Algorithms 11 and 12 are algorithms for secure route maintenance. SRERR is as described in Figure 6 . SRERR in the secure route maintenance is the same Function SRERRConstruct is described in Function 5DSRERRConstruct which takes as input error information EI, a signature σ and the number ET is a function which constructs SRERR with error type ET . Algorithms11 and 12 are algorithms in the secure route maintenance. 
Key Management
Key management is a mechanism to revoke and update the ID. The key management utilizes SRERR extended from RERR. The SRERR has two kinds of error types, i.e., a key revocation type (Error Type=4) and key update type (Error Type=5) for key management. Basic Concept. When a node ID is revoked as a public key, a management server broadcasts a SR-ERR included in the node ID and a signature generated by the management server via Signing to other nodes. When nodes receive the SRERR, they verifies the signature in the SRERR by Verification with the management server ID. If it is valid, nodes delete routes included in the revocation ID in their caches. They store the revocation ID in their caches to check whether the ID is in routes under route construction.
Algorithms. Algorithms 13 and 14 are algorithms in Key Revocation. The SRERR in Key Revocation is as described in Figure 7 . The Error Type is 4, the Error Source Node ID is the management server ID, the Error Destination Node ID is broadcast and Type-Specific Information is the revocation ID in the SRERR. The signature generated by the management server is added to the SRERR. Basic Concept. A management server issues a new ID and generates a secret key corresponding to the ID in KeyDerivation. The management server sends a SRERR included in the new ID, the secret key and a signature generated by the management server via Signing to the node in which ID is updated. The secret key is encrypted by a shared key between the management server and the node. The node verifies the signature in SRERR by Verification with the management server ID. If the signature is valid, the node updates its ID and stores the secret key decoded by the shared key. Then the management server revokes the old ID with a SRERR in the key revocation.
Algorithms. Algorithms 15 and 16 are algorithms in the key update. The SRERR of the key update is described in Figure 8 . The Error Type is 5, the Error Source Node ID is the management server ID and the Error Destination Node ID is the updating node ID. A new node ID and an encrypted secret key is described in the Type-Specific Information. A signature generated by the management server is added to the SRERR. 
store ID u as revocation node ID in its cache. 
DISCUSSION
Performance Analysis
We show IDSDR can decrease the memory size and the computational overhead. That is, routing overhead (RO) and routing latency (RL) of ISDSR are smaller than those of other secure routing protocols. These are main bottlenecks for secure routing protocols. Thus, these decreasement is important for prati- Table 2 shows notations and their descriptions in this section.
Routing Overhead (RO)
The RO here refers to the total number of bytes that are transmitted over the network to establish a secure path from any source to any destination. As DSR does not include any security mechanism, the RO of the DSR with t intermediate nodes to establish a valid route is expressed by the following equation:
We consider the RO of ISDSR. In ISDSR, each intermediate node sends a single signature to the next node in both the search phase and the reply phase. Therefore the RO of the ISDSR with t intermediate nodes is computed by the following equation:
Ghosh and Datta (Ghosh and Datta, 2013) calculate ROs of other secure routing protocols as follows:
Ghosh and Datta (Ghosh and Datta, 2013 ) have calculated RO IDSAODV by using ID SIZE instead of HASH SIZE . However, IDSAODV needs the hash values of its public keys of RSA as ID. Therefore, we calculate RO IDSAODV by using HASH SIZE . SDRP needs hardware addresses of nodes as IDs in addition to IDs of nodes, which are used in the original specification of DSR. We denote by ID SIZE the overhead based on this redundant information. However, such redundant information is unnecessary for ISDSR because the overhead with respect to the IDs in ISDSR is identical to RO DSR . DSR is extremely similar to AODV. Therefore it is fair to consider RO DSR = RO AODV . The RO of DSR is smaller than that of other secure routing protocols.
Routing Latency (RL)
RL of a routing protocol is the time required to establish a valid secure route. In the case of a secure routing protocol, RL includes latency because of route discovery and latency because of the addition of security mechanisms in the protocol.
In Secure Routing Discovery, a signature is generated (1 + t) times and the signature is verified only one time in a destination node.
RL ISDSR =RL DSR + (2 + t) × ECCSig GEN
+ 2 × ECCSig VER .
Ghosh and Datta (Ghosh and Datta, 2013 ) also calculate the RLs of other secure routing protocols as follows:
RL SDRP =RL AODV + (2 + t) × ECCSig GEN + (3 + 2 × t) × ECCSig VER + t × (MAC GEN + MAC V ER ) + (1 + t) × Key GEN .
The RL of the DSR is also the same as that of the AODV. We know that computing ECC-based signatures is faster than computing RSA-based signatures. The shared generation involves bilinear pairing, which is also fast. Therefore the RL of the ISDSR is comparable with any of the existing routing protocols.
Security Analysis
If route information is forged or there are attacker nodes in the route information, a signature for the route information is rejected by verification. In other words, if a route is constructed with a valid signature, the route consists of only honest nodes. That is, ISDSR satisfies requirement 1 in Section 4.1. Because we do not consider that attackers rob nodes and their control in ISDSR, the attacker cannot know any node's secret key. Therefore, the attackers cannot forge signatures. That is, ISDSR satisfies requirement 2 in Section 4.1. Based on these observations, IS-DSR can guarantee the validity of the route information when a route is constructed. Meanwhile, the security level of ISDSR is equivalent to that of ARAN, i.e., "managed-open".
CONCLUSION
We proposed ISDSR extended from DSR, which is the routing protocol in sensor networks, and we considered ISDSR's security for the importance of the security of sensor networks. We showed that ISDSR guarantees that there are no attacker nodes in the constructed routes. Our future research considers further implementation and evaluation of ISDSR. We focus on the use of NS-3 1 to evaluate ISDSR. Other future research will consider stricter security analysis. In particular, we plan to use formal methods as described in (Arnaud et al., 2010; Arnaud et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 2014) . We also plan to extend other routing protocols in ad hoc networks, e.g, AODV, to utilize IBSAS in the future.
